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Accessing health services at an early age is important to future health and life outcomes. Yet, little is
currently known on the role of health insurance in facilitating access to care for children. Exploiting a
regression discontinuity design made possible through a policy to provide health insurance to pre-school
aged children in Vietnam, this paper evaluates the impact of health insurance on the health care utili-
zation outcomes of children at the eligibility threshold of six years. Using three rounds of the Vietnam
Household Living Standards Survey, the study ﬁnds a positive impact on inpatient and outpatient visits
and no signiﬁcant impact on expenditures per visit at public facilities. We ﬁnd moderately high use of
private outpatient services and no evidence of a switch from private to covered public facilities under
insurance. Results suggest that adopting public health insurance programs for children under age 6 may
be an important vehicle to improving service utilization in a low- and middle-income country context.
Challenges remain in providing adequate protections from the costs and other barriers to care.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The impact of public health insurance programs has received a
great amount of attention due to its importance to universal health
coverage, a goal common to many low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) (Lagomarsino et al., 2012). Universal health coverage
strives to provide equal access to the health care services that
people need without causing ﬁnancial hardship (World Health
Organization, 2010). This goal is particularly important for chil-
dren for whom there exists a high elasticity of demand for health
care (Ching, 1995; Leibowitz et al., 1985; Sauerborn et al., 1994) and
the early intervention of health services has been shown to be
critical to future health and life outcomes (Chen and Jin, 2010; Kraft
et al., 2009). Universal health coverage may be achieved through
different means; chief among these is the expansion of public
health insurance programs. Little is known about the impact of
public health insurance programs on the utilization outcomes for
children in LMICs. Improving knowledge on the health seeking
behaviors of children under insurance has important implications
for policy makers in the design and ﬁnancing of beneﬁt packages. If
beneﬁt packages are aligned with population needs then healthrlton, Victoria 3010, Australia.
M. Palmer).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleﬁnance systems stand the best chance of meeting universal health
coverage goals (World Health Organization, 2010).
Through pooling risk across individuals, health insurance lowers
the price of health care at the time of purchase leading to increased
use of health care (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). The effect on uti-
lization, however, will depend upon the level of beneﬁts provided
and individual circumstances, alongside supply-side factors which
affect levels of service utilization. Health seeking behaviors of
younger children under insurancewill conceivably differ to those of
older children due to differences in underlying health status and
health care needs, among other characteristics. This apparent lack
of an adequate comparison group presents an evaluation challenge.
Another concern is that the decision to purchase insurance may be
linked to decisions around health status and health care usage. In
this case, regression estimates of the impact of health insurance on
service outcomes will be biased (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000).
In this study, we circumvent these problems through a regres-
sion discontinuity (RD) design, made possible by a 2005 policy in
Vietnam to provide health insurance coverage to children under the
age of six. The basic idea of the RD design is that children on either
side of the cutoff age are similar and, in a sense, randomly assigned
to insurance coverage. Under some plausible assumptions, differ-
ences in outcomes for children in the vicinity of the cutoff are
attributed to differences in insurance coverage generating anunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Fig. 1. Insurance coverage 2004e2010, aged 0e10 years.
Source: Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010
M. Palmer et al. / Social Science & Medicine 145 (2015) 217e226218unbiased estimate of treatment effects. RD design is generally
regarded as having the greatest internal validity of the quasi-
experimental estimators and requires relatively mild assumptions
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
Using three cross-sections of the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Survey (2006, 2008 and 2010), and exploiting a discon-
tinuity in insurance coverage induced by a policy intervention with
a fuzzy RD design, we evaluate the 2005 policy across a range of
utilization outcomes at public facilities. We also examine possible
substitution effects between public and uncovered private service
utilization and the impact on health expenditures. This paper
makes a novel contribution to the scant literature on the impact of
public health insurance programs for young children in a LMIC
context. The following section provides background on child health
insurance in LMICs with particular attention to Asia and Vietnam,
as well as review of child health insurance program impacts. This is
followed by separate descriptions of the data and methodology
used in this study before a presentation of the results. The paper
concludes with a discussion of results and ﬁnal remarks for policy.
2. Background
2.1. Public health insurance expansion in LMICs and in Asia
Public insurance schemes typically comprise a collection of co-
contributory, contributory and non-contributory schemes tar-
geted to distinct population groups such as formal sector em-
ployees and civil servants, informal sector employees and students,
and social beneﬁciary groups (Giedion et al., 2013). In recent years,
many LMICs have expanded public health insurance coverage as a
means to improving access to formal health care services for their
populations, and providing ﬁnancial protection from the costs of
health care, on the path towards universal health coverage (World
Health Organization, 2010). For instance, through a series of re-
forms, China tripled health insurance enrollment across the pop-
ulation from 30% in 2003 to over 90% in 2012 (Xiong et al., 2013);
Ghana increased coverage from 35% to 66% from 2007 to 2010
through voluntary contributory insurance reforms (Odeyemi and
Nixon, 2013); and most notably, Thailand reached 100% coverage
by 2005 through its “30 Baht” reforms of 2001 (Gruber et al., 2014).
2.2. Child health insurance programs in LMICs and in Asia
Targeting speciﬁc population groups, such as children, the poor
and persons with disabilities in social health protection programs is
critical to health equity and has been highlighted as a priority area
in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Groce et al., 2011; Mitra,
2013; Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013; Petrera et al., 2013; Reinbold,
2011; United Nations, 2013). Targeting speciﬁc groups may be
motivated by other considerations. Several studies have demon-
strated that the elasticity of demand for health care may be highest
for children and the poor in LMIC settings, implying that user-fees
will deter these groups from using formal health care the most
unless ﬁnancial risk protection measures are taken (Asfaw et al.,
2004; Gertler et al., 1987; Sauerborn et al., 1994). There also ex-
ists evidence, in the context of the United States and Burkina Faso,
that medical demand for younger children may be more price
sensitive than it is for older children (Leibowitz et al., 1985;
Sauerborn et al., 1994).
Some LMICs have expanded health insurance by targeting
certain vulnerable populations like children. This is for example the
case in Guatemala, Argentina and Paraguay with programs for
children and mothers, and Egypt with a program for school age
children (World Bank, 2013; Yip and Berman, 2001). The arrival ofchild health insurance programs in Asia is a recent development. To
our knowledge, only four countries have introduced child-targeted
health insurance programs (India (state of Karnataka), the
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam) and little is known on the im-
pacts of these programs. The Indian state of Karnataka developed a
state-funded health insurance scheme for school children in 2006
(Government of Karnataka, 2014). The scheme automatically pro-
vides health cards to children enrolled in grades 1e10 offering
regular health check-ups and free care for various ailments. Prior to
1995, Taiwan had developed various health schemes, which left
uninsured mostly children under 14 and adults over 65. When
Taiwan created the National Health Insurance in 1995, its social
insurance program which consolidated the previously established
programs, it started to target coverage of certain beneﬁts to pre-
viously uninsured children (e.g. free annual check-ups and immu-
nizations to children) (Cheng, 2003). In the Philippines, as part of an
expansion towards universal health insurance coverage, an insur-
ance program was launched for school-aged children (Quimbo
et al., 2011).
Vietnam's public health insurance journey can be traced back to
1986 when it introduced Doi Moi, a system of economic and po-
litical reforms that opened the socialist society to market forces
(Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009). In 1992, social health insurance
was ﬁrst introduced for civil servants and formal sector employees
in a compulsory co-contributory scheme. The reforms also included
a non-contributory scheme for ‘policy beneﬁciaries’ that included
war heroes and other persons of merit in the socialist revolution. In
1994, a voluntary contributory insurance scheme was established
initially for school aged children who by 2003 comprised over 99%
of enrollees (Ekman et al., 2008). This proportion has reduced over
time due to the gradual take up by farmers and the self-employed
(71% in 2010, calculation by authors). In 2003, persons living in poor
households became eligible to non-contributory health insurance
through the Health Care for the Poor Program (non-contributory
health insurance has been available to the poor since 1999 but was
expanded more formally in effect from 2003 and later in 2006). In
2005, all children under the age of six years were added to the list of
non-contributory beneﬁciaries (Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
2004, 2005). By the year 2010, some 61% of the Vietnamese pop-
ulation was insured (calculation by authors).
Fig. 1 plots insurance coverage for children, aged 0e10 years,
over the years 2004e2010. The dramatic uptake for children under
the age of six after the 2005 intervention illustrates that the policy
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under six years of age was issued with a free health insurance card,
compared to just 26% in 2004. Prior to the national law on the
protection, care and education of children that came into effect in
2005 (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2004, 2005), and for children
six years of age and above, children were eligible for the voluntary
(school) health insurance scheme or the poor household scheme.
The rise in coverage for school aged children is most clearly illus-
trated in 2004, and is predicted in Appendix Fig. 2.
2.3. Child health outcomes and care utilization in Asia
The expansion of health insurance coverage to children in some
countries in Asia through targeted or other programs has come in a
background of less than optimal health and health care utilization
indicators. Many LMICs in Asia have reduced their under-5 mor-
tality rates since the 1970s. As shown in Appendix Table 1, Vietnam
seemed to be above par with most Asian nations at 32 deaths per
1000 live births in 2000. The rate is lower than in most Asian
countries (38 in Cambodia, 37 in China, 87 in India, 52 in Indonesia,
120 in Laos, 40 in the Philippines) but higher than in Thailand (23).
From 1995 to 2003, in Vietnam, 33% of children under 5 suffered
from being moderate to severely underweight; 36% and 6% of
children under 5 suffered from moderate to severe stunting and
wasting, respectively. These anthropometric ﬁgures fall in between
the values reported for other Asian nations. For instance, for
moderate to severely underweight, Vietnam's share at 33% falls
below Cambodia (45%) and Laos (40%), but above China (10%),
Indonesia (26%), the Philippines (31%), and Thailand (19%).
The picture on health care utilization for children under 5 prior
to the 2005 reform is somewhat mixed. Using ﬁgures compiled in
Appendix Table 1, Vietnam had immunization rates between 96%
and 99% in 2004, and had reached immunization levels of high-
income countries. During the 1998e2004 period, Vietnamese
children under 5 with acute respiratory infections sought treat-
ment from health care providers 71% of the time. Likewise, 71% of
children under 5 suspected of having pneumonia were taken to a
health care provider for treatment. These levels exceed those of
nearby countries, but also highlight the fact that there is limited
access to health care for nearly one third (29%) of children. Further,
from 1996 to 2004, 39% of Vietnamese children under 5 with
diarrhea received ORT with feeding, compared to 59% in Cambodia,
22% in India, 61% in Indonesia, 37% in Laos, and 76% in the
Philippines.
Overall, available data for the early 2000s suggests that there
remained potential for further improvements in the health out-
comes and health care utilization levels of children under age 6 in
Vietnam. The numbers point to a need to increase health care uti-
lization among the child population and justify a study of the
impact of health insurance expansion on health care utilization for
children under age 6.
2.4. Impacts of child health insurance programs in Asia
Few studies have assessed the impact of child health insurance
on health, health care utilization and other life outcomes, and
especially for children under age 6. Ensuring access to quality
health services is particularly important to children and has been
found to contribute to positive health and educational outcomes. In
the Philippines, through a difference-in-difference design, Kraft
et al. (2009) found that a health insurance intervention targeted
at poor children resulted in a reduction in the likelihood of wasting
and having an infection. It was also found that delaying care by
more than two days contributed to wasting and was less likely
among the insured. In rural China, insured households were foundto have better outcomes in child school enrollment and young child
mortality, although the latter effect was removed once controlled
for selection bias in a difference-in-difference with matching
design (Chen and Jin, 2010).
Interestingly, most studies on health care utilization impact
originate from Vietnam. The exception was a study from Indonesia
that evaluates the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis years (1997e2000)
on child health care utilization using a difference-in-difference
with matching design (Somanathan, 2008). The study found that
utilization of public outpatient care declined for all children during
the crisis years but by less for insured children with greatest pro-
tective effect for children aged 0e5 years.
With respect to Vietnam, Nguyen andWang (2013) assessed the
impact of the 2005 child health insurance reform in Vietnam using
a difference-in-difference design and two waves of the Vietnam
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS), 2004 and 2006. The
authors compared utilization outcomes for children aged 6e7 to
the treatment group of children younger than six years (divided
into 0e3 years and 4e5 years). They found a positive impact of the
policy on public inpatient and outpatient district hospital visits and
a reduction in total health expenditures and the likelihood of
catastrophic health expenditures among policy beneﬁciaries in the
4e5 years age range.
All other studies in Vietnam relate to older children and results
are mixed. Using two waves of VHLSS panel data (2006 and 2008)
and a ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, Nguyen (2011) evaluated outpa-
tient service utilization of children aged 6e14 years and found no
impact of insurance on the number of visits and a negative impact
on expenditures per visit. Other studies examined the voluntary
insurance scheme more broadly which, as noted, consists largely of
school age children. Using self-collected data from three provinces
and an endogenous dummy variable model, Jowett et al. (2003)
found that insurance signiﬁcantly reduces average expenditures.
By contrast, using VHLSS 2004e2006 data and a difference-in-
difference with matching speciﬁcation, Nguyen (2012) found no
impact of voluntary insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures per
visit, although he did ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
outpatient and inpatient visits.
This paper provides an alternate estimation to the recently
published study by Nguyen and Wang (2013). Whilst the adopted
methodology of this earlier study sweeps out differences between
the two groups that are ﬁxed over time, as the authors note, there
remains the problem of time-variant unobservable differences.
Furthermore, results are limited to non-poor children only when
there exists evidence thatmedical care demandmay differ between
poor and richer children (Ching, 1995). The authors use a pseudo
panel speciﬁcation resulting in small sample sizes which may affect
the precision of their estimates, particularly those relating to
inpatient admissions where the numbers of visits is low. To
circumvent these various issues in estimationwe apply an alternate
fuzzy RD design to a large unrestricted sample of children. The
caveat of our approach is that treatment effects are a weighted
average at the discontinuity threshold.
Unlike the majority of papers, we disaggregate public and pri-
vate visits to examine substitution effects. In Vietnam, like in many
LMICs, insurance is often effective only at public facilities which
consist of hospitals (district, provincial, central) and commune
clinics. Private facilities can register with the national insurance
agency. However, the proportion of registered private facilities is
presently low: up to 2010, only 200 private health care facilities had
registered with the national insurance agency versus 7600 public
facilities (Nguyen, 2012). Prior to the child health insurance reform,
the private sector was a strong service provider for young children
(Nguyen et al., 2002). The afore-mentioned evaluation of the re-
form ﬁnds a positive, yet statistically insigniﬁcant, effect on private
Table 1
Description of outcome variables.
0e5 years 6e10 years Difference
Mean (S.E) Mean (S.E) Mean (S.E)
Inpatient (public)
Had a visit 0.082 (0.003) 0.044 (0.002) 0.038*** (0.004)
Number of visits 1.363 (0.034) 1.270 (0.037) 0.093* (0.054)
Expenditures per visit 472.667 (39.879) 611.332 (69.076) 138.665* (74.584)
Outpatient (public)
Had a visit 0.370 (0.005) 0.228 (0.004) 0.142*** (0.007)
Number of visits 2.843 (0.052) 2.413 (0.053) 0.430*** (0.008)
Expenditures per visit 47.676 (2.032) 52.419 (2.592) 4.743 (3.303)
Outpatient (private)
Had a visit 0.178 (0.004) 0.134 (0.004) 0.044*** (0.005)
Number of visits 3.928 (0.098) 3.012 (0.099) 0.916*** (0.143)
Expenditures per visit 58.995 (2.313) 56.425 (2.690) 2.57 (3.543)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Expenditures are in
Vietnamese dong and adjusted to 2006 prices using CPI. Number of visits and ex-
penditures per visit estimates are for children with at least one visit.
Source: authors' calculation based on Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
2006, 2008, 2010
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signiﬁcant impact of insurance was found on the use of private
sector services among children in Indonesia (Somanathan, 2008).
These studies suggest that insurance is not associated with any
substitution from private to public health care among child pop-
ulations as is commonly reported in the adult population (Axelson
et al., 2009; Pradhan et al., 2003).Table 2
Description of independent variables.
0e5 years 6e10 years Difference
Mean (S.E) Mean (S.E) Mean (S.E)
Insured 0.896 (0.003) 0.818 (0.004) 0.078*** (0.005)
Age (months) 36.147 (0.210) 102.724 (0.186) 66.577*** (0.282)
Male 0.519 (0.005) 0.514 (0.005) 0.005 (0.007)
Kinh ethnicity 0.751 (0.004) 0.752 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006)
Urban 0.236 (0.004) 0.212 (0.004) 0.024*** (0.006)
Household size 5.296 (0.019) 5.069 (0.018) 0.227*** (0.026)
Poor household 0.172 (0.004) 0.196 (0.004) 0.024*** (0.006)
Age of household head 44.288 (0.150) 42.535 (0.133) 1.753*** (0.201)
Male household head 0.801 (0.004) 0.825 (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006)
Married household
head
0.865 (0.003) 0.892 (0.003) 0.027*** (0.005)
Education of household head
None 0.104 (0.003) 0.099 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004)
Less than primary 0.202 (0.004) 0.199 (0.004) 0.003 (0.006)
Primary 0.269 (0.005) 0.301 (0.005) 0.033*** (0.007)
Lower secondary 0.251 (0.004) 0.256 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006)
Upper secondary 0.125 (0.003) 0.109 (0.003) 0.016*** (0.005)
Above secondary 0.048 (0.002) 0.036 (0.002) 0.013*** (0.003)
Employment sector of household head
Not employed 0.126 (0.003) 0.085 (0.003) 0.041*** (0.005)
Informal employment 0.656 (0.005) 0.684 (0.005) 0.028*** (0.007)
Formal employment 0.059 (0.002) 0.050 (0.002) 0.009*** (0.003)
Government 0.160 (0.004) 0.181 (0.004) 0.022*** (0.006)
Region
Red River Delta 0.171 (0.004) 0.159 (0.004) 0.012** (0.005)
Northeast 0.146 (0.004) 0.148 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005)
Northwest 0.086 (0.003) 0.066 (0.003) 0.020*** (0.004)
North Central Coast 0.098 (0.003) 0.112 (0.003) 0.014** (0.004)
South Central Coast 0.084 (0.003) 0.093 (0.003) 0.010** (0.004)
Central Highlands 0.095 (0.003) 0.108 (0.003) 0.013*** (0.004)
Southeast 0.121 (0.003) 0.126 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005)
Mekong Delta 0.199 (0.004) 0.187 (0.004) 0.012*** (0.006)
Remote commune 0.256 (0.005) 0.259 (0.005) 0.003 (0.007)
Observations 9588 8929
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: authors' calculation based on Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
2006, 2008, 20103. Description of the data
Data for this study is drawn from three cross-sections of the
VHLSS: 2006, 2008, and 2010. We limit the sample to children aged
0e10 years, yielding sample sizes of 6,042, 5,870, and 6605 for the
respective three years (N ¼ 18,517). The survey contains a rotating
panel component with ﬁfty percent of 2006 clusters retained for
the 2008 round. Developed since 1992e93 from the World Bank
living standards measurement survey (LSMS), the VHLSS collects a
vast array of socio-economic and health information at the indi-
vidual, household and commune level (e.g. General Statistics Ofﬁce
of Vietnam, 2010).
We draw heavily on the health care module which collects in-
formation on individual inpatient and outpatient visits and ex-
penditures in the last twelve months prior to survey. Table 1
presents descriptive statistics of the outcome variables for chil-
dren under age six, and aged six to ten years. Children less than six
years of age were more likely to contact public health services and
recorded a higher number of average visits when accessing services
compared to older children. They were roughly twice as likely to
record a public inpatient and outpatient visit. Approximately half
the proportion of younger children with a public outpatient visit
recorded a private outpatient facility visit, at a level slightly higher
than older children. Expenditures per visit were one quarter lower
at public inpatient facilities and similar at outpatient facilities
among young children recording at least one visit compared to
older children.
We draw upon other survey modules to control for a range of
individual, household head, and commune level variables.
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2 for the
two age groups. Approximately 90% of younger children were
insured compared to 82% of older children. With the exception of
age, the distribution of the remaining variables was similar across
the samples. Both age groups were evenly divided between male
and female, and approximately one-quarter belonged to an
ethnicity other than Kinh and lived in urban areas. Household size
was around ﬁve and approximately one ﬁfth of the households
were classiﬁed as poor by local commune authorities. The vast
majority of household heads were married males with a lower
secondary school education or less and self-employed. One quarter
of children surveyed were classiﬁed as living in remote communes.
4. Methodology
We adopt a RD design where assignment to treatment is
determined (at least partly) by a cutoff of another ‘forcing’ variable
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Jacob et al.,
2012; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). First introduced in 1960, RD design
has recently taken a prominent place in the evaluation literature.
Applications abound and include, for example, the use of test score,
poverty index, and geographical boundary cutoffs to determine the
effects of an intervention on outcomes (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The design exploits the discontinuity in the forcing variable around
the cutoff as a source of exogenous variation to identify a causal
impact of the treatment at the threshold. A discontinuous jump in
the outcome variable in the vicinity of the cutoff is attributed to the
change in the level of treatment.
We apply a fuzzy RD (FRD) design where the probability of
treatment increases by less than one at the cutoff. In our case, some
children below the age of six are not formally enrolled in insurance
and some children equal to or above the age of six are. For the
analysis, we code all children under six as insured since under the
implementation of the law, uninsured children under the age of six
are entitled to fee exemptions at covered facilities upon the pre-
sentation of identiﬁcation information (Socialist Republic of
Table 3
Probability model for being insured, aged 0e10 years.
Coef. (S.E)
Treatment age (<72 months) 0.202*** (0.009)
Age (months)a 0.001*** (0.000)
Agea  treatment age 0.001*** (0.000)
Male 0.003 (0.004)
Kinh ethnicity 0.021*** (0.007)
Urban 0.031*** (0.005)
Household size 0.001 (0.001)
Poor household 0.079*** (0.005)
Age of household head 0.001*** (0.000)
Male household head 0.004 (0.007)
Married household head 0.014* (0.008)
Education of household head (reference category: none)
Less than primary 0.011 (0.007)
Primary 0.012* (0.007)
Lower secondary 0.015* (0.008)
Upper secondary 0.023** (0.009)
Above secondary 0.038*** (0.011)
Employment sector of household head (reference category: not employed)
Informal employment 0.010 (0.007)
Formal employment 0.023** (0.010)
Government 0.012 (0.009)
Region (reference category: Red River Delta)
Northeast 0.004 (0.007)
Northwest 0.003 (0.009)
North Central Coast 0.023*** (0.008)
South Central Coast 0.019** (0.008)
Central Highlands 0.024*** (0.009)
Southeast 0.025*** (0.008)
Mekong Delta 0.053*** (0.007)
Remote commune 0.018*** (0.005)
Year (reference category: 2006)
2008 0.024*** (0.005)
2010 0.024*** (0.005)
Constant 0.747*** (0.019)
Observations 18,517
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Ordinary least squares are used. Standard errors
in parenthesis.
a Centered at 72 months.
Source: authors' calculation based on Vietnam Household Living Standards
Survey 2006, 2008, 2010
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less than one at the threshold, the corresponding jump in outcomes
can no longer be interpreted as the average treatment effect under
the FRD design. Instead, it is recovered as the ratio of jumps in the
estimated outcome and probability of treatment at the limit to-
wards the cut-off point from both directions (Lee and Lemieux,
2010):
t ¼
lim
c/6
E½Y jA ¼ c  lim
c/6þ
E½Y jA ¼ c
lim
c/6
P½D ¼ 1jA ¼ c  lim
c/6þ
P½D ¼ 1jA ¼ c
Estimation of the FRD can be performed with parametric or
nonparametric approaches. We elect a parametric approach over a
larger range of data primarily due to the low number of inpatient
observations, but we use a non-parametric approach in sensitivity
analyses in Section 5.1. Drawing strength upon observations further
away from the cutoff, parametric approaches provide a more pre-
cise estimate of the treatment effect. Potential for incorrect esti-
mation of the functional form increases with distance from the
cutoff, leading to a bias in the treatment effect. Alternatively, a
narrow interval near the cutoff associated with non-parametric
estimations will reduce sample size and the precision of esti-
mates (standard errors), especially when the population under
study is limited to start with, as in this study of small children.
Unless the underlying function is exactly linear there will also be
bias associated with nonparametric procedures. Without knowing
the true functional form, it is impossible to know which bias is the
lesser. For further discussion on the merits of alternate estimators
refer Lee and Lemieux (2010).
Following Hahn et al. (2001) who ﬁrst drew the link between
instrumental variables (IV) and fuzzy RD, average treatment effects
under a parametric design are estimated by two-stage-least-
squares with an indicator variable for the treatment group as the
excluded instrument:
Di ¼ gþ b1Ti þ b2ðAi  cÞ þ b3ðAi  cÞ,Ti þ bk
X
k
Xki þ εi (1)
Yi ¼ aþ b4Di þ b5ðAi  cÞ þ b6ðAi  cÞ,Ti þ b0k
X
k
Xki þ ε0i (2)
whereD is a binary indicator of insurance status for individual i, Y is
the outcome variable, T is a binary indicator of the treatment group
(age < 6 years), A denotes age (in months), c is the cutoff (72
months), X is a vector of independent variables, ε and ε0 are random
error terms. The coefﬁcient, b4, is identiﬁed as the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of children who receive insurance (but
would not otherwise receive it) at the age cutoff, in the limit. It is
analogous to the general discontinuity gap ratio estimand (t) in the
exactly identiﬁed case and may be viewed as a weighted LATE with
weights reﬂecting the ex-ante likelihood that the individual is near
the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We use for Y three variables: a
dummy variable indicating that the person had a visit, the number
of visits, and the expenditures per visit.
In equations (1) and (2), with the third term of the right hand
side, age is centered at the cutoff point to enable any shift at the
cutoff point to be interpreted as a shift in the intercept, and is
interacted with the treatment group dummy to allow for differ-
ences in slopes on either side of the cutoff. This is recommended in
the case of nonlinear relationship between the outcome and rating
variable or data far away from cutoff (Jacob et al., 2012).
The ﬁrst stage equation in these models is estimated using or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regression. For the second stage, to the
extent that levels of health care utilization, or the effects ofinsurance, differ with the age of children linear estimation of the
treatment effect will be biased. Descriptive plots of outcomes
against age suggest that the true functional formmay be nonlinear.
To limit bias associated with incorrect speciﬁcation of the func-
tional form, for the second stage, we apply nonlinear models
appropriate to each of the outcome variable: Probit for the dummy
variable indicating that the person had a visit, Poisson for the
number of visits and Tobit for expenditures per visit. As recom-
mended for parametric estimation of RD (Lee and Lemieux, 2010),
we tested the functional formwith the inclusion of polynomials on
the forcing variable and determined a low-order polynomial with
interaction with the treatment group indicator as the best
approximation, as speciﬁed in equation (2).
Covariates were included in the models to reduce sampling
variability and improve precision of the treatment effect estimates,
as well as to address bias associated with observations that were
not close to the cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Nguyen and
Knowles (2010) analyze the demand for insurance by school aged
and adolescent children (6e20 years) in Vietnam and found a
strong socio-economic gradient at both the household and
commune level. We thus include a collection of individual,
household-head and geographical variables suspected as jointly
correlated with the demand for insurance and health care (refer
Table 2). Standard errors are estimated as robust 2SLS standard
errors, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and all calcu-
lations were performed using Stata (Version 13).
Table 4
IV Regressions on public health care utilization outcomes, aged 0e10 years.
Inpatient Outpatient
Had a visit (1) Number of visits (2) Expenditures per visit (3) Had a visit (1) Number of visits (2) Expenditures per visit (3)
Insurancea 0.068* (0.040) 1.133** (0.480) 28.421 (85.620) 0.217*** (0.065) 0.748*** (0.285) 4.325 (8.172)
Age (months)b 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.003) 0.036 (0.346) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.155*** (0.032)
Ageb  treatment dummy 0.001*** (0.000) 0.014*** (0.004) 1.621*** (0.441) 0.000 (0.000) 0.004** (0.002) 0.068 (0.043)
Male 0.013*** (0.004) 0.256*** (0.078) 24.194*** (8.146) 0.017** (0.007) 0.139*** (0.037) 2.636*** (0.810)
Kinh ethnicity 0.011* (0.006) 0.189 (0.126) 8.368 (13.934) 0.023** (0.011) 0.043 (0.063) 1.854 (1.372)
Urban 0.010* (0.005) 0.280*** (0.108) 15.396 (11.953) 0.019** (0.009) 0.103** (0.052) 0.403 (1.154)
Household size 0.006*** (0.001) 0.098*** (0.025) 12.349*** (2.961) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.117*** (0.014) 2.415*** (0.281)
Poor household 0.000 (0.006) 0.117 (0.109) 2.903 (12.923) 0.014 (0.011) 0.000 (0.056) 0.020 (1.276)
Age of household head 0.000 (0.000) 0.004 (0.004) 0.983** (0.419) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.002) 0.032 (0.041)
Male household head 0.009 (0.006) 0.324** (0.133) 3.869 (13.782) 0.019* (0.011) 0.210*** (0.066) 1.324 (1.455)
Married household head 0.003 (0.008) 0.033 (0.182) 20.366 (17.479) 0.009 (0.014) 0.009 (0.086) 0.636 (1.801)
Education of household head (reference category: none)
Less than primary 0.006 (0.007) 0.407** (0.160) 13.240 (15.351) 0.029** (0.013) 0.080 (0.078) 6.058*** (1.604)
Primary 0.010 (0.007) 0.421*** (0.141) 20.421 (15.114) 0.035*** (0.013) 0.082 (0.076) 6.868*** (1.598)
Lower secondary 0.003 (0.008) 0.315* (0.161) 6.795 (16.646) 0.039*** (0.014) 0.137* (0.082) 7.672*** (1.741)
Upper secondary 0.002 (0.009) 0.163 (0.180) 22.894 (19.852) 0.043*** (0.017) 0.113 (0.093) 9.446*** (2.070)
Above secondary 0.013 (0.013) 0.206 (0.259) 13.484 (29.269) 0.040* (0.023) 0.143 (0.131) 16.039*** (3.188)
Employment sector of household head (reference category: not employed)
Informal employment 0.006 (0.008) 0.049 (0.161) 1.546 (18.009) 0.016 (0.013) 0.033 (0.073) 1.324 (1.633)
Formal employment 0.020* (0.012) 0.675*** (0.231) 19.218 (26.736) 0.023 (0.021) 0.019 (0.112) 0.768 (2.801)
Government 0.003 (0.009) 0.145 (0.190) 14.508 (20.969) 0.035** (0.015) 0.125 (0.088) 1.189 (1.881)
Region (reference category: Red River Delta)
Northeast 0.005 (0.007) 0.097 (0.155) 7.640 (16.020) 0.005 (0.013) 0.056 (0.067) 8.250*** (1.666)
Northwest 0.003 (0.009) 0.028 (0.189) 20.005 (21.246) 0.066*** (0.017) 0.244*** (0.093) 8.411*** (2.290)
North Central Coast 0.006 (0.008) 0.149 (0.163) 23.598 (17.596) 0.067*** (0.014) 0.285*** (0.079) 12.744*** (1.734)
South Central Coast 0.003 (0.008) 0.089 (0.184) 17.794 (16.382) 0.016 (0.014) 0.222*** (0.073) 6.473*** (1.692)
Central Highlands 0.009 (0.008) 0.107 (0.192) 21.124 (18.024) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.443*** (0.080) 0.312 (1.768)
Southeast 0.001 (0.007) 0.046 (0.160) 19.708 (16.076) 0.052*** (0.013) 0.471*** (0.078) 5.184*** (1.729)
Mekong Delta 0.003 (0.007) 0.137 (0.171) 18.038 (15.177) 0.071*** (0.012) 0.735*** (0.060) 2.043 (1.445)
Remote commune 0.009* (0.005) 0.060 (0.118) 22.466** (10.951) 0.017* (0.009) 0.113** (0.047) 0.421 (1.092)
Year (reference category: 2006)
2008 0.007 (0.005) 0.149 (0.097) 3.425 (10.202) 0.036*** (0.008) 0.182*** (0.049) 5.694*** (1.012)
2010 0.001 (0.005) 0.064 (0.099) 5.793 (10.114) 0.017** (0.008) 0.051 (0.046) 2.514** (1.051)
Observations 18,517 18,517 18,517 18,517 18,517 18,517
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Expenditures are in Vietnamese dong and adjusted to 2006 prices.
Results in columns (1), (2) and (3) are for probit, poisson and tobit regressions. Coefﬁcients are marginal effects.
a Instrumented by treatment age dummy (<72 months).
b Centered at 72 months.
Source: authors' calculations based on Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2006, 2008, 2010
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The drop in the level of insurance coverage at age six induced by
the 2005 policy in Vietnam is clearly depicted in Fig. 1, and
remained when we plotted the expected probability of being
insured as a function of age (Appendix Fig. 1). First-stage regression
results are presented in Table 3. The treatment group indicator
(age < 6 years) and instrument is strongly associated with the
probability of being insured (20.2%), as needed for any IV speciﬁ-
cation. Other notable positive predictors include living in a poor
household, urban area, remote commune, with an older, married,
better educated household head, and being interviewed in more
recent years. Variables that negatively affect the probability of be-
ing insured include higher age, belonging to the majority Kinh
ethnic group, having a household head with less than primary
education, and residing in central and southern regions.
Results for the second stage IV regressions on public facility
outcomes are shown in Table 4. Insurance increases the probability
of visiting an inpatient and outpatient service, as well as the
number of visits. Insurance increases the probability of an inpa-
tient visit by 6.8% and an outpatient visit by 21.7%; the average
number of inpatient and outpatient visits increases by 1.13 and
0.75, respectively. The impact of insurance on expenditures is
positive for both service types. However, the impact is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Higher predicted utilization levels amongyounger age children and discontinuity at the cutoff are illustrated
in Appendix Figs. 3e5.
To examine possible substitution effects, we present second
stage IV regressions for private outpatient utilization in Table 5.
Insurance is positively associated with the probability of a visit,
number of visits, and expenditures per visit. Weighted at the age
threshold of six years, children experienced a 16.2% increase in the
probability of a visit, an average 1.32 increase in the number of
visits, and a 17,188 Vietnamese dong increase in expenditures per
visit. As shown in Appendix Fig. 6, predicted levels of private uti-
lization are lower than at public facilities.
5.1. Sensitivity testing
We run a number of sensitivity tests. All results from sensitivity-
testing are available upon request.
As depicted in Appendix Figs. 3e6, models are not predicting
observed utilization levels for children less than one year of age
particularly well. Our causal treatment effect estimates are, in ef-
fect, a weighted average of observations closer to the eligibility
threshold. It is possible that observations far from the threshold are
inﬂuencing results. We test the sensitivity of the functional form by
trimming observations far from the threshold. In turn, we exclude
from the sample children less than one year of age, observations
near the highest and lowest values of the age range (maximum and
Table 5
IV Regressions on private outpatient utilization outcomes, aged 0e10 years.
Had a
visit (1)
Number of
visits (2)
Expenditures
per visit (3)
Insurancea 0.162***
(0.050)
1.316***
(0.331)
17.188***
(6.177)
Age (months)b 0.001***
(0.000)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.100***
(0.025)
Ageb  treatment dummy 0.001***
(0.000)
0.007
(0.004)
0.131***
(0.033)
Male 0.005
(0.005)
0.205***
(0.073)
0.996
(0.610)
Kinh ethnicity 0.068***
(0.010)
0.802***
(0.128)
9.027***
(1.185)
Urban 0.039***
(0.007)
0.421***
(0.085)
4.130***
(0.767)
Household size 0.010***
(0.002)
0.150***
(0.026)
1.009***
(0.216)
Poor household 0.031***
(0.009)
0.217
(0.153)
3.611***
(1.133)
Age of household head 0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.004)
0.025
(0.030)
Male household head 0.002
(0.008)
0.221*
(0.122)
0.435
(0.995)
Married household head 0.011
(0.011)
0.203
(0.153)
1.255
(1.289)
Education of household head (reference category: none)
Less than primary 0.009
(0.011)
0.038
(0.157)
0.440
(1.218)
Primary 0.004
(0.011)
0.184
(0.165)
0.141
(1.228)
Lower secondary 0.010
(0.012)
0.007
(0.167)
0.088
(1.295)
Upper secondary 0.001
(0.013)
0.224
(0.197)
1.235
(1.510)
Above secondary 0.021
(0.018)
0.288
(0.227)
5.042**
(2.181)
Employment sector of household head (reference category: not employed)
Informal employment 0.015
(0.010)
0.018
(0.124)
0.399
(1.156)
Formal employment 0.017
(0.016)
0.215
(0.205)
1.943
(1.992)
Government 0.012
(0.012)
0.076
(0.151)
0.412
(1.398)
Region (reference category: Red River Delta)
Northeast 0.082***
(0.012)
1.079***
(0.152)
8.606***
(1.579)
Northwest 0.145***
(0.021)
2.140***
(0.313)
15.660***
(2.825)
North Central Coast 0.087***
(0.012)
1.180***
(0.158)
10.058***
(1.630)
South Central Coast 0.065***
(0.010)
0.486***
(0.111)
7.386***
(1.265)
Central Highlands 0.104***
(0.011)
1.000***
(0.135)
11.379***
(1.341)
Southeast 0.115***
(0.009)
1.230***
(0.114)
12.002***
(1.138)
Mekong Delta 0.149***
(0.009)
1.736***
(0.121)
13.660***
(1.047)
Commune remote 0.033***
(0.008)
0.339***
(0.091)
2.842***
(0.916)
Year (reference category: 2006)
2008 0.021***
(0.007)
0.104
(0.103)
1.892**
(0.789)
2010 0.007
(0.006)
0.057
(0.100)
0.203
(0.757)
Observations 18,517 18,517 18,517
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Expenditures are in
Vietnamese dong and adjusted to 2006 prices.
Results in columns (1), (2) and (3) are for probit, poisson and tobit regressions.
Coefﬁcients are marginal effects.
a Instrumented by treatment age dummy (<72 months).
b Centered at 72 months.
Source: authors' calculations based on Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey
2006, 2008, 2010
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ditures per visit at public facilities become negative yet remain
statistically insigniﬁcant. For utilization outcomes, estimates
remain positive and are smaller inmagnitude. However, they are no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. We furthermore applied non-
parametric local linear regressions to smaller data bandwidths
(36 months, 18 months, 9 months) and returned similar results to
the trimmed parametric estimators above (Nichols, 2011). More
limited statistical power is in line with what we would expect from
smaller sample size estimations.
In addition, we run a placebo test: we explicitly test for a
treatment effect before the reform with data for 2004. As shown
below in Table 6, pre-reform, the treatment effect is negative for all
outcomes, and often statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates lower
utilization outcomes for children in the treatment group (under age
six). This is further shown in Appendix Table 2: the ﬁrst stage
regression coefﬁcient on the treatment dummy is 0.201 and is
signiﬁcant at the one percent level, and there is a jump in the
predicted probability of being insured at age six (Appendix Fig. 2).
These negative pre-reform results with 2004 data seem logical
given that a lot of children then accessed insurance through the
voluntary contributory insurance scheme for school-aged children
from age six. We further calculate the difference of the effects with
post- and pre-treatment data (Table 6). The differences are positive,
and statistically signiﬁcant for selected outcomes: this result sug-
gests that estimates with post-treatment data only in Tables 4 and 5
may be underestimates of the policy impact.
One obvious concernwith our RD design is that something other
than insurance status may be contributing to the jump in outcomes
at the age threshold. It is plausible that young children are more
prone to getting sick and, in turn, access health care at a higher rate
than older children thus putting a downward bias on our results.
Since we disaggregate age in months in the analysis, it is unlikely
that factors will change sharply approaching the threshold. We
conﬁrm this by running local regressions of possible confounders,
including measures of morbidity (days bedridden and days unable
to perform regular activities) and household head characteristics
(gender, education level and employment sector), on age (months)
and a dummy variable indicating treatment age and found little or
no statistically signiﬁcant association on the interaction term. We
found marginal signiﬁcance on one morbidity measure (number of
days unable to perform regular activities) for the largest bandwidth
of 36 months.
Equally, it is important that no discontinuity in the average
outcome exists at other values of the forcing variable. It is
conceivable that the commencement of primary school at age 6 in
Vietnam is associated with an outpatient health check-up or
vaccination thus putting a downward bias on our results. However,
birthdays are distributed throughout the school year so the rate of
health care utilization should not change discontinuously with age
in months. We conﬁrm this in a reduced form regression of
outcome variables on age (months) for the sample aged 6 years. We
also ran local linear regressions centered at the age midpoints of
the young and older child samples and found no evidence of
discontinuity.
A further threat to validity is the extent to which individuals can
manipulate the forcing variable around the eligibility threshold.
Whilst this is not directly testable, the self-report of relatively more
individuals with an age just below the age cutoff is suggestive of a
violation of the no-manipulation assumption. We test this using a
technique developed by McCrary (2008) which involves running
local linear regressions on the number of individuals by age
(months) on either side of the cutoff and testing whether the dif-
ference in the two intercepts is statistically different from zero. As
expected, the t-test fails to reject continuity in the forcing variable.
Table 6
Difference in treatment effects pre- and post-reform, aged 0e10 years.
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
ATT (S.E) ATT (S.E) ATT (S.E)
Inpatient (public)
Had a visit 0.152 (0.095) 0.068* (0.040) 0.220** (0.102)
Number of visits 1.461 (1.504) 1.133** (0.480) 2.594 (1.889)
Expenditures per visit 324.459** (163.811) 25.183 (95.855) 349.642 (220.111)
Outpatient (public)
Had a visit 0.230*** (0.086) 0.217*** (0.065) 0.447*** (0.102)
Number of visits 4.136 (5.904) 0.748*** (0.285) 4.884 (7.388)
Expenditures per visit 21.691* (11.965) 4.955 (9.108) 26.646* (13.346)
Outpatient (private)
Had a visit 0.167** (0.080) 0.162*** (0.050) 0.329*** (0.097)
Number of visits 2.702* (0.080) 1.316*** (0.331) 4.188*** (0.169)
Expenditures per visit 21.181*** (8.015) 19.394*** (7.122) 40.575*** (9.975)
Observations 6932 18,517
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are bootstrapped at 100 repetitions and in parenthesis.
Coefﬁcients are marginal effects. Expenditures are in Vietnamese dong and adjusted to 2004 prices.
Pre-reform (2004) models are the same as post-reform (2006e2010) models with the exception of the count models which included additional polynomials on the rating
variable and its interaction.
Source: authors' calculations based on Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010
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panel observations in our pooled cross-sections (for 2006 and
2008) by restricting regressions to individual cross-sections and
determine that serial correlation is not a signiﬁcant problem.
6. Discussion
To the extent insurance uptake and health care utilization are
chosen by households, estimates on the impact of insurance on
outcomes are biased. To address problems associated with adverse
selection we apply a RD design that exploits discontinuity of in-
surance coverage at an age threshold as a source of exogenous
variation to identify the causal impact of insurance. Due to the
existence of competing insurance programs, namely a voluntary
health insurance program targeted to school aged children,
discontinuity in coverage at the cutoff of six years was not
dichotomous. We apply a fuzzy RD (FRD) which takes account
factors other than the threshold rule which affect program partic-
ipation. Following Hahn et al. (2001) who made the link between
instrumental variables (IV) and FRD, we estimate treatment effects
using two-stage least-squares. As in a standard IV framework,
treatment effects are a local average treatment effect for individuals
affected by the treatment. Being local, external validity of results is
limited. The advantage is that they are robust to any confounding
factors as long as they occurred in a continuous way around the age
threshold. RD design is thus generally regarded as having a rela-
tively high degree of internal validity compared to other non-
experimental estimators.
We ﬁnd that insurance has a positive impact on the probability
of having at least one public inpatient visit and, to a greater extent,
at least one outpatient visit, as well as on the number of visits. This
result holds up to a number of sensitivity checks which overall add
validity to our ﬁndings, although the statistical signiﬁcance is lost
while working with trimmed samples closer to the age cutoff or
while using a non-parametric local linear regression of smaller
bandwidths. This positive result on health care utilization is
consistent with results of a difference-in-difference evaluation of
the 2005 child health insurance reform (Nguyen and Wang, 2013)
but stands in contrast with a study of older children (6e20 years) in
Vietnam using a difference-in-difference speciﬁcation, which ﬁnds
no impact of insurance on visits (Nguyen, 2011). This relatively
larger impact on utilization found for younger versus older childrenin the Vietnam health insurance literature is consistent with ﬁnd-
ings in studies beyond Vietnam, such as an assessment of the health
card program in Indonesia (Somanathan, 2008), and those relating
to the price elasticity of demand for health care for young children
in the United States and Burkina Faso (Leibowitz et al., 1985;
Sauerborn et al., 1994). To the extent that improved access to
health care for younger children leads to improved health and life
outcomes, this is an important ﬁnding for policy makers in Vietnam
and in other LMICs.
At the same time, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of insurance on
out of pocket health expenditures. This result is consistent with the
result of Nguyen and Wang (2013) for children aged 0e3, but
different from the negative and signiﬁcant impact on expenditures
they ﬁnd for children aged 4e5. This difference in results for chil-
dren aged 4e5 could come from the difference in sample and
methodology: Nguyen and Wang (2013) use a sample of non-poor
children only with two waves of the VHLSS (2004 and 2006) and
with a difference in difference estimation, while this paper's esti-
mates are for all children near the age cutoff of 6 using RD and
based on 2006, 2008 and 2010 VHLSS data. Our ﬁnding that in-
surance has little or no impact on expenditures is consistent with
other studies on health insurance in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2012;
Palmer, 2014; Sepehri et al., 2011; Wagstaff, 2007) and in other
LMICs (Escobar et al., 2010).
For the case of Vietnam, there are several plausible explanations
for the lack of an impact. Waiting times and bureaucratic pro-
cedures for the insured at public facilities are substantial (Chau,
2013; Lam, 2012; Nghe, 2012; Tran, 2009). In addition, pro-
cedures for the insured in seeking care at higher level facilities are
cumbersome and involve obtaining a written referral at each tier.
Instead, patients (or their guardians) may elect to consult without
using their insurance card. In our 2010 sample, around one quarter
of insured children under six did not use their health insurance card
when consulting at public facilities.
Whilst the list of reimbursable items under insurance is exten-
sive, not all available procedures are covered and expenditure caps
exist for covered items. The drugs offered are generic and hospitals
routinely suffer drug shortages with insured patients having to
purchasemedication from private pharmacies at their own expense
(Somanathan et al., 2013). Our measure of health expenditures
included ‘bonus’ payments to doctors so it is likely that informal
payments are contributing to the health expenditures of the
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examine the extent to which informal payments were contributing
to overall health expenditures. A culture of informal ‘envelop’
payments at health care facilities is commonly reported in Vietnam
(e.g. Somanathan et al., 2013).
On the supply side, there exist incentives for doctors to supply
services for the insured under a fee-for-service ﬁnancing arrange-
ment. Under a series of recent reforms designed to give hospitals
more autonomy, fee-for-service ﬁnancing was associated with
increased hospital admissions, higher out-of-pocket spending,
more laboratory tests and imaging per case for the insured in
Vietnam (Wagstaff and Bales, 2012). Currently, Vietnam is tran-
sitioning towards a capped payment system for each individual
enrolled with the provider. By imposing ﬁnancial risks on pro-
viders, capitation has led to a reduction in the level of service
provision for the insured at district hospitals (Nguyen et al., 2013).
It is possibly due to these barriers that a notable proportion of
children under the age of six reported at least one visit at a private
outpatient facility, which by and large are not registered with the
national insurance agency. Like Nguyen and Wang (2013) and a
study of a child health card in Indonesia (Somanathan, 2008), we
ﬁnd no evidence of a substitution from private to public care under
insurance. It may also be that private services are simply more
conveniently located or a kind of wealth or income effect associated
with insurance is pushing households to consume more services,
including more private services. The private sector is growing
rapidly in Vietnam, the true extent of which is unknown sincemany
providers have not registered with the Government (Lieberman
and Wagstaff, 2009). In one province alone, there was almost
twice the number of private than public providers (Tran et al.,
2005). Our results suggest that the private sector remains an
important source of health care for the insured in Vietnam.
Consistent with other countries in Asia and Africa, continued efforts
are required in developing the relationship between the private
sector and the public health care system (Bloom et al., 2012).
7. Conclusion
This study evaluates a 2005 reform to provide fully subsidized
health insurance to children under the age of six in Vietnam. Our
review of the literature prior to the reform suggests that there was
room for improvement in the health and health care utilization of
children in Vietnam. Exploiting a discontinuity in insurance
coverage induced by the 2005 reform, we investigate whether in-
surance might have played a role in improving access to care for
children as well as whether it had any signiﬁcant impact in
reducing expenditures. Results overall indicate that the policy has
been successful in improving access to outpatient and inpatient
care. However, we could ﬁnd no evidence of a substitution from
uncovered private outpatient facility use or that the reform had any
signiﬁcant impact on health expenditures and thus on providing
ﬁnancial protection. Results support recent Government efforts to
reduce cost and other barriers to entry into the public health care
system and deepen the registration of private providers into the
health insurance system. Further research is needed to identify if
the reform led to improved health outcomes or improved access to
speciﬁc care services. Although more research is needed on young
children, broadly, the study results suggest that adopting public
health insurance schemes for young children may be an effective
way to boost health care utilization in a LMIC context.
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